Brigham Young University Prelaw Review
Volume 13

Article 10

1-1-2000

Full Issue
Prelaw Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byuplr

BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Review, Prelaw (2000) "Full Issue," Brigham Young University Prelaw Review: Vol. 13 , Article 10.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byuplr/vol13/iss1/10

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University Prelaw Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive.
For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

TO OUR READERS:

The Brigham Young University Prelaw Review is a student-written,
student-edited journal published once a year by the Brigham Young
University Prelaw Advisement Center. Since 1992, the journal has
sought to provide BYU undergraduate students with a venue to publish
budding legal scholarship. Circulation includes all American Bar Association accredited law schools, BYU prelaw students, and other interested readers. Submission is open to all BYU students. For detailed
submission information please contact the Prelaw Advisement Center.
Contents represent the opinions of the authors and not necessarily
those of the editors, advisors, Brigham Young University, or its sponsoring institution, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

© Copyright 2000 by the Prelaw Advisement Center
Brigham Young University
logo design by Tony Smart
Printed in the United States of America

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

PRELAW REVIEW
V O L U M E 13 ♦ 2000

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
PROVO, UTAH

Editor-in-Chief
Matthew R. Connelly
Managing Editor
Trent E. Christensen
Associate Editors
Eric R. Carlson
Dana Carver
Katherine L. Davidson
Chris D. Dennis
Benjamin Lindorf
Melissa Moreton
Publisher
Eileen Crane
Production Advisor
Linda Hunter Adams

Prelaw Student Association Officers

Women’s Prelaw Forum Officers

AARON GLEAVE

COLLETTE HARRELL

BRETT BRYCE

SONIA JIMINEZ

DAN WEBBER

KATHERINE L. DAVIDSON

BRANDON BOSWORTH

MELISSA MORETON

SHAUNA PEARSON
TRENT E. CHRISTENSEN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

PRELAW REVIEW
V O L U M E 13 ♦ 2000

Introduction
Defining “Property”: A Debate Dividing
More Than Marital Assets
Julie A. Juhasz

6

9

Human Capital and the Clean Financial Break
Nathan W. Andersen and L. John LeSueur

17

Divorce and Women
Syed Fahad Saghir

25

Alimony Reform
H.L. Rogers

33

Standard Role Specifications and
Default-Based Premarital Agreements
Xiaoyu Lin

41

And You Thought You Weren’t Bringing
Any Baggage to Your Marriage
Bryan Harper

47

Shifting Sexual Divisions of Labor
Chelsea L. Grimmius

55

INTRODUCTION

P

roducing a scholarly undergraduate journal devoted to legal
topics can be an engaging, yet problematic enterprise. Since serious treatment of the law is largely absent in most undergraduate
curriculums, undergraduate authors approach legal research and writing with several limitations. Chief among these is the fact that any author attempting to construct an original, significant argument is hampered by an inadequate understanding of the law. It does not help that
the editors are subject to the same problem. Although we recognize
these and other inherent difficulties, we believe a publication of this
type is valuable in many ways.
First and foremost, conducting legal research provides an avenue
for undergraduates to better understand the law and its relationship to
everyday life. Second, legal writing allows authors the chance to distill
what they have read, carefully organizing their thoughts into logical,
well-written arguments. Third, publishing as undergraduates not only
gives authors a sense of accomplishment, but is an encouraging motivator for them to continue writing and publishing. Lastly, for those of
our authors going on to law school or legally oriented professions, the
legal research and writing performed for these articles provides
valuable preparation.
We have chosen to follow tradition and devote the journal to one
legal subject. In this issue, every article discusses some aspect of
family law. We asked several interested authors to read Jana B. Singer’s
article “Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won’t
Fit,” appearing in the spring 1997 issue of Family Law Quarterly. In her
article, Singer examines several significant family law issues, including
no-fault divorce; career enhancement of nondomestic parents; women
and children in poverty; and the opportunity costs of domestic parenting. Authors were asked to take a position on one of these issues using
legal journal articles and other authoritative sources for support. Of the
articles written, the ones appearing in this issue are, in our opinions,
the most informative. Readers will, of course, want to refer to the full
text of Singer’s article to resolve any contextual questions.

The opening of a new millennium provides an ideal opportunity
to seek improvement. Readers of past issues will notice in this volume
what we hope are several positive changes. In terms of content and
scholarly quality, we tried to select articles that take courageous stances
on interesting issues while representing opinions of authors from diverse backgrounds. Articles underwent a stricter editing process and
were carefully source checked for accuracy. To aid in this endeavor,
those of our editors with little or no editing experience were required to
take a credit-carrying editing course taught through the Brigham Young
University English Department. In addition, all of our work has been
closely supervised by both a caring faculty advisor, Eileen Crane, and a
competent and helpful production advisor, Linda Hunter Adams.
As for outward appearance, we have, for the first time, typeset the journal using professional typesetting software, rather than a standard word
processor. This improvement, coupled with a more attractive cover and
new logo design, is intended to give a professional appearance to
the journal.
Finally, this publication could not exist without the generous financial sponsorship of people committed to student scholarship. We
offer our sincerest thanks to the following at Brigham Young University: Honors and General Education, The David M. Kennedy Center
for International Studies, and the Prelaw Advisement Center. We also
wish to thank several commercial entities for their continuing support
of our work. Alexander’s Digital Printing and Alexander’s Legal Copy
(www.alexanders.com) consistently deliver a broad range of high-quality,
affordable printing services. This journal is an example of their fine
work. Kaplan Educational Centers (www.kaplan.com), world leaders
in standardized test preparation, provide many BYU students with excellent LSAT training. The BYU Bookstore (www.byu.edu/bookstore)
serves an important role in helping BYU students prepare for law
school, assisting them with economically feasible ways to fulfill their
personal computing and other educational needs.
We hope you enjoy the articles in this issue.
Matthew R. Connelly
Editor-in-Chief

DEFINING “PROPERTY”:
A DEBATE DIVIDING MORE THAN
MARITAL ASSETS
JULIE A. JUHASZ
Divorce law reforms are necessary to prevent unfair and arbitrary
outcomes. Child support awards and property divisions both illustrate the
sometimes capricious nature of divorce awards. A clearer definition of marital property is necessary to ensure justice and consistency.

P

revious to no-fault divorce law reforms, marital misconduct
determined child custody, property division, and child support
payments.1 Eliminating fault has largely been hailed as a step
toward fairer, more objective judgments; its absence, however, and subsequent lack of foundational principles has led to seemingly arbitrary
outcomes in other ways. Two divorce issues demonstrate the inconsistencies created by the no-fault system: child support awards and property division, especially human capital division.
Recent reforms have curbed inconsistency in the area of child support awards, including judicial guidelines for determining award
amounts. These guidelines establish objective factors judges should
consider in determining support amounts. Establishing guidelines in
defining and dividing marital property similar to those provided for
child support would alleviate the uncertainties and injustices present in
current application of human capital division.

Eliminating Fault
No-fault divorce reforms sought to eliminate the subjective judgments that resulted under the fault system.2 Fault considerations may
not have provided the ideal impartial foundation for divorce decisions,
but they did provide a foundation nonetheless. Jana Singer, though
hardly a fault enthusiast, admits that the field of family law has been
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searching for justifying principles since its rejection of marital fault.3 To
increase the objectivity of decisions, consistency and clarity need to be
reestablished in divorce law. The controversial issue of human capital
division emphasizes this need.
The question of whether education, degrees, job training, or professional licenses can be defined and divided as marital property has
forced many scholars to reflect upon the legal meaning of property in
light of a changing world economy.4 The current world economy generally emphasizes knowledge, and values analytical and managerial skills
above unskilled physical labor. Thus, the human capital acquired
during marriage may be far more valuable than assets such as cars or
savings accounts, making its inclusion or exclusion of major significance.5 Yet most lawmakers and courtrooms have been reluctant to
define human capital as divisible property. Defining the term marital
property is a debate that has divided scholars and legal experts as often
as it has divided assets. In the search for consistency and clarity, an
analysis of marital property and comparison to the child support
reforms may reveal solutions to the ongoing human capital debate.

Child Support Reforms
As mentioned, no-fault divorce theory yielded a system lacking
consistent principles that dictate and justify divorce decisions, particularly in child support awards. Child support amounts were arbitrarily
determined previous to the 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments. These statutes required states to specify guidelines for support
awards.6 This new uniformity was part of a number of measures intended to produce more consistent procedure, amounts and enforcement of child support payments. These reform measures were driven by
several studies that unveiled the devastating effects such capricious
award determinations were having on children. One Denver study
reported awards ranging from six percent to twenty-six percent of the
noncustodial parent’s income.7 This wide variation did not seem to
correspond with any objective variables such as number of children,
income level of the custodial parent, or the supporting parent’s income
in absolute terms.8 The study also revealed that a shocking sixty-six percent of the fathers in the study made higher monthly car loan payments
than child support payments.9
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Child support is important because women and children are the
parties most likely to be economically devastated by divorce.10 Child
poverty can be devastating in others ways, such as limited educational
opportunities, higher rates of delinquency, increased teen pregnancy,
and less access to healthcare.11 Child poverty has grown over the last
several decades, and many experts concur that “the case-by-case method
for setting child support awards has contributed to this decline in children’s standards of living.”12
In 1984, Congress intervened on behalf of children to remedy the
lack of statutory direction that arguably exacerbated the problems of
child poverty. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments, effective
October 1, 1987, set forth that
each state . . . must establish guidelines for child support award
amounts within the state . . . by law or by judicial or administrative
action, and shall be reviewed . . . to ensure that their application results
in the determination of appropriate child support award amounts.13

The Denver study concluded that the greatest determining variables
in award amounts were seasonal variations, the representation of the
respondent, and the attitude of the district attorney.14 These subjective
factors seem irrelevant to the best interest of the child or the family. The
Child Support Enforcement Amendments required systematic methods
to be developed, applied, and evaluated based upon objective standards
without dictating to the states exactly what the methods should be. The
tide is turning against growing child poverty and noncompliance of
child support orders. Other measures aimed to reform child support and
enforce compliance have been implemented. Many of these policies
have been shown to be effective.15 Uniformity in child support awards
has been successful in improving court efficiency and enhancing the
satisfaction for the parties involved.16 Such judicial guidance could be
equally helpful in establishing uniformity in human capital division and
generally eliminating inconsistent and arbitrary outcomes.

Dividing Property—Arbitrary Decisions
Similar arbitrary application of no-fault divorce law persists in
human capital division as marital property. Courts have implemented
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three different methods for dividing marital property: strict title theory,
equitable distribution, and community property theory.17 Only Mississippi, South Carolina, and West Virginia continue to use a strict title
division.18 The other forty-seven states’ laws have evolved to consider all
property acquired during the marriage to be marital property, regardless
of the name on the title. Yet even this more expansive definition of
marital property does not explicitly allow for human capital division.
The result is a great deal of legal chaos.
Some courts have allowed for human capital to be attributed as an
investment of the marriage, rather than the sole efforts of one spouse.
Other cases have refused to recognize human capital as shared property.
In the 1983 case of Woodworth v. Woodworth, one spouse’s juris doctorate was determined to be part of the couple’s marital assets.19 One year
later, in a case involving a woman seeking similar compensation for her
investments in her husband’s Master’s degree, the judge denied that the
degree was divisible property.20 The justification for dividing the law
degree apparently seemed unjust to the judge who denied the latter
woman compensation, even though she may have had reasonable expectation to be granted compensation based upon Woodworth v. Woodworth. This article does not seek to argue that one decision was right
and the other wrong, but rather that each case seems unfair in light of
the other. Human capital division is an area of divorce settlement that
needs more uniformity and clarity.
At least three solutions would provide greater uniformity. The first
is to maintain a traditional definition of property, considering human
capital as an individual rather than a marital asset. This seems to remain the general preference of courts. Dividing human capital requires
rough estimations of the value of the degree and difficult estimations of
the supporting spouses’ investments, including financial contributions,
childcare responsibilities, and any foregone professional opportunities.
Most judges have avoided this complicated type of estimation and
division. A traditional definition of marital property does not allow for
assets that are inseparable from the individual.21 Human capital does
not have all the traditional properties of assets recognized historically
by the law. It cannot be inherited, sold, or in any other way transferred
from one person to another. However, while human capital is not included in the current laws, neither is it explicitly excluded.22 Maintaining
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a traditional view of marital property would provide a solution to disparate rulings only if human capital were addressed directly and were
clearly defined as nondivisible property.
A second viable solution would be to modify the law to clearly include human capital as property and specify procedures for dividing it.
Many assert that traditional notions of property are inappropriate in
today’s economy.23 The economy has undergone a significant change and
“family law has not successfully acclimated itself to this change, and as a
result, substantial injustices are being created in property settlements.”24
Klebanoff observed that the courts are more likely to classify the enhanced earning power of a spouse as marital property than the degree itself.25 In both Woodworth v. Woodworth and In re Marriage of Hortsmann,
the courts accepted division of future earnings.26 Notably, the amounts
were calculated differently in each case.27 Thus, this definition permitted
the consideration of spousal contributions while leaving the details
of division to the discretion of the courts. Clarifying the definition of
marital property to include human capital appears to be a more flexible
alternative than excluding human capital entirely. Even so, the current
law requires amending to provide courts with justification for dividing
human capital fairly.
Jana Singer provides a third possibility she calls “income sharing.”28
This alternative would pool both spouses' incomes for some time following divorce. If expanded upon and accompanied with specific guidelines for implementation, this may also eliminate the current arbitrary
outcomes in divorce decisions. Any of these three solutions would create
a uniformity which would seem more equitable than the disarray observable in comparing cases such as Woodworth v. Woodworth with
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf.

Conclusion
In the absence of fault from recent divorce proceedings, there is an
observable lack of theoretical foundation. This has led to a greater need
for judicial guidance in certain areas of divorce decisions. Establishing
uniform methods for determining child support awards has focused
the decision on objective and relevant considerations such as the child’s
needs and the parent’s ability to pay. Similarly, greater statutory direction in defining marital property would establish greater consistency
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and fairness for parties disputing human capital division. Contemporary scholars have expanded the term “property” in light of a changing
world economy that values education and human capital. The law may
accept or reject this new meaning, but certainly the change has necessitated clarification.
Julie A. Juhasz, originally from Meridian, Idaho, is a senior at Brigham Young
University majoring in political science. After graduation, she plans to attend law
school and work as a child advocate.
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HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE CLEAN
FINANCIAL BREAK
NATHAN W. ANDERSEN AND L. JOHN LESUEUR

No-fault divorce does not properly compensate women for their efforts to
raise children. Only by incorporating human capital in the divorce settlement can women be properly compensated for their investments.

I

n recent years courts have used the clean break philosophy to settle
divorce, attempting to equally divide property accumulated during
marriage. This approach allows both husbands and wives to walk
away from divorce relatively free from long-term financial interdependence. However, many legal scholars claim that a clean financial break
undercompensates women relative to men. This leads to the argument
that a clean financial break is incompatible with equitable divorce
settlements, causing some legal scholars to reject the clean financial
break as the optimal method of adjudicating divorce. In an attempt to
both maintain the clean financial break and provide more equitable
settlements, some legal scholars suggest expanding the scope of property by viewing human capital acquired during marriage as an asset to
be split between spouses upon divorce. The inclusion of human capital
as property creates greater equality in divorce settlements while maintaining the benefits of a clean financial break.
The notion of a clean financial break first began when fault-based
divorce was replaced by no-fault divorce. Prior to the 1970s, divorce
was granted “only upon proof that one of the parties was at fault for
having breached spousal duties.”1 Through this system, alimony was
awarded more or less to the party that was at fault. Because of this system, fault-based settlements usually created a web of financial entanglements, prohibiting the couple from doing exactly what divorce intended
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them to do—break all ties emotionally, physically, and financially.
Milton C. Regan Jr., in his article “Spouses and Strangers: Divorce
Obligations and Property Rhetoric,” concludes that fault-based divorce
“formally treated ex-spouses as ongoing family members whose claims
against one another continued to reflect the fact of their marriage.”2
In 1970, California initialized no-fault divorce, completely eliminating
fault as a consideration for determining alimony. According to Jana B.
Singer, “facilitating a clean financial break replaced punishing a guilty
spouse (or protecting an innocent one) as the overriding objective of
divorce-related financial adjustments.”3 This change rid couples of lifelong financial connections and enabled them to move on with their
lives.4 The transition from fault-based divorce to no-fault divorce established the clean financial break in divorce settlements, necessitating the
courts to reexamine the definition of marital property.
While administering a clean financial break, courts must separate
each spouse’s personal property from jointly owned marital property.
Once courts determine what constitutes marital property (usually
defined as property acquired during marriage), they simply divide it
between both spouses equally.5 However, even this simple definition
does not prevent disputes between spouses about whether certain assets
are personal or marital property. Legal scholars have suggested that the
boundaries of marital property become clearer when marriage is viewed
in economic terms, with the market being the motivating force behind
all marital interaction. Joan M. Krauskopf, a law professor at the University of Missouri at Columbia, writes:
In economic analysis, the family is a decision making unit that operates to maximize the unit’s utility in consumption and also in the
allocation of human time and production activities. This view of the
family is an application of the traditional economic theory of the
firm.6

Krauskopf continues by suggesting that the traditional family unit is
extremely efficient in allocating the family’s resources—both time and
money—in order to maximize returns. Although economic principles
do not completely explain marital behavior, viewing marriage in economic terms can be helpful in deciphering marital property boundaries.
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Currently, courts do not view educational degrees acquired by
either spouse during marriage as marital property. Because of this, a
clean financial break will undercompensate domestic spouses. The following scenario illustrates this inequity. Suppose a young couple, Tom
and Sue, get married while both are still in college. Because of their
limited budget, Sue quits school in order to support the completion of
Tom’s legal education. She financially provides for him during these
years, driven by the hope of someday reaping the financial rewards of
her husband’s increased future income. However, shortly after Tom
graduates from law school they divorce. At this point, Tom’s future
earning potential far exceeds his wife’s. In addition, the couple’s traditional property (cars, real estate, housing, and so forth) is extremely
limited. If a clean financial break were to occur, dividing only their
traditional property, Sue would be undercompensated relative to Tom.
This simple example illustrates that, although a clean financial break is
ideal, divorce settlements need adjustment in order to accommodate
nontraditional forms of property. Krauskopf and other scholars have
presented the human capital theory as the solution.
Human capital theory explains the wages of laborers as a function
of the training they receive.7 The origin of this theory dates back to the
early 1960s when some economists realized “that a substantial growth
in income in the United States remains [unexplained] after the
growth in physical capital and labor has been accounted for.”8 In an
effort to explain this rise in income, Gary S. Becker, one of the pioneering scholars of the human capital theory, pointed to the investments
human beings make in themselves by receiving “schooling, on-the-job
training, medical care,” and so forth.9 Becker called these types of
investments “human capital investments.” By including the growth in
human capital with the growth in physical capital and labor, Becker
successfully captured more of the rise in income experienced in the
United States. As a result of this success, human capital theory has
become very influential in explaining labor wages.
Additionally, some economists claim that human capital theory
will continue to explain more and more of labor wages as our economy
evolves. For example, Allen M. Parkman, Professor of Management at
the University of New Mexico, claims that the primary sources of income “in a manufacturing and agricultural [economy]” are “physical
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assets, such as houses and land, and financial assets, such as stocks and
bonds.”10 Whereas in an economy dominated by a large service sector,
“the primary income producing assets become the individuals themselves.”11 Thus, as our economy continues to become more and more
service oriented, we should expect to see a decrease of investments in
traditional types of capital and an increase of investments in human
capital. This will make it even more important for the courts to recognize human capital as marital property.
Due to the work of human capital theorists, economists have
broadened their definition of property to include human capital. For
example, economists define investment as “anything that accumulates
capital” and capital as “a stock of assets that yields a stream of income
or utility over time.”12 If these definitions are used as the determinants
of capital (property), then no distinction can be made between a person’s investments in schooling and his or her investments in physical
capital, such as real estate. The inability to draw an economic distinction between these two types of investments leads to the argument that
courts should treat both types of investments equally when adjudicating divorces. Thus, in order for clean break settlements to be just,
courts must broaden the legal definition of property to include human
capital.13 The example of Tom and Sue illustrates this point. A clean
break settlement that does not grant Sue part-ownership of the human
capital her husband acquired during their marriage will greatly undercompensate her for her investments in the marriage. However, courts
have almost uniformly rejected the inclusion of human capital as
marital property.
Regan suggests four main reasons why courts have not viewed
human capital as marital property. First, the most common justification
used by the courts is that, in their eyes, a degree such as a law or medical degree does not fall under the traditional definition of property
because “it has no exchange value or any objective value on an open
market.”14 For instance, it is impossible to buy, sell, or trade an educational degree for money or anything else. Regan explains it well when
he states that a degree “cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed,
or pledged.”15
A classic example of this understanding is found in Graham v.
Graham.16 In this 1978 case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the
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husband’s M.B.A. was not considered property because it did not have
any open market exchange value.17 Here the court correctly identifies
the impossibility of separating human capital assets from their owners.
However, even if human capital “cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged,”18 it can be rented. Fundamental to human capital theory is the concept that individuals who embody a set of skills can
rent those skills to employers. If individuals could not rent their skills,
there would be no justification for employers to pay higher wages to
degree holders than to non-degree holders. In Graham v. Graham, the
court argued that if something is not marketable, then it is not property. However, by failing to recognize that human capital can be rented
to employers, the court mistakenly identifies human capital as not
marketable. Thus, in this argument, the court fails to demonstrate that
human capital is not property.
Secondly, Regan states that the courts are hesitant to identify
human capital as property in divorce settlements because the “valuation
of future earning capacity is highly speculative.”19 Although economists
are fairly successful at valuing human capital assets across large samples
of people, they are unable to pinpoint the exact future income a specific individual’s human capital will produce. This is because future
income is contingent upon many variables, such as luck or enthusiasm,
which tend to balance out in large samples of people but greatly affect
the income of specific individuals. Courts have argued that the speculation required to divide human capital assets provides justification for
not dividing the assets at all. However, the courts have been willing to
speculate the value of future incomes in tort cases for years.20 Therefore,
if courts wish to be consistent, they must not use this reason for not
including human capital as marital property.
Part of the reason courts hesitate to speculate on future income is
that, in a clean financial break, property settlements at divorce are not
modifiable.21 This inability to modify divorce settlements also leads to
a third reason courts hesitate to classify human capital as property.
Courts fear that ex-spouses, especially professionals, could be trapped
in their careers due to heavy financial obligations, “and thus [be]
severely restricted in the liberty to choose a more satisfying way of
life.”22 Referring again to Tom and Sue, suppose Tom was required to
provide a large payment to Sue in compensation for her investments in
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his education. After being divorced for a year, Tom decides that he is
unhappy as a lawyer and wishes to be a high school teacher. Because
the earning capacity of a lawyer far exceeds the earning capacity of a
teacher, Tom decides he is unable to both make the career change and
fulfill his financial obligation toward his ex-wife. Some may argue that
incorporating human capital as property threatens the freedom of
people like Tom to choose their careers. However, trying to protect
Tom’s freedom to change careers jeopardizes Sue’s investments. If courts
agree that Sue has invested in Tom’s human capital, they must agree
that Tom has borrowed from Sue. Thus, Tom should be free to choose
whatever career he wishes, so long as he reimburses Sue for her investment. Because Sue invested in Tom’s human capital during the
marriage—when the marital contract was in force—the need to protect
Sue’s prior investment outweighs the loss of Tom’s ability to change
occupations. Consequently, courts should not use this justification in
attempting to separate human capital from marital property.
Lastly, some judges purport that even if human capital is property,
it should not be considered marital property.23 In the 1984 case Sullivan
v. Sullivan,24 Judge Kaufman stated that the future value of an educational degree “is entirely dependent upon the future efforts of the
educated spouse.”25 Here, Judge Kaufman seems to imply that owning
capital necessitates control over how that capital is used. However, the
purchasing of stocks presents a case where individuals own capital but
have no control over how that capital is deployed.26 For example, an
ordinary purchaser of Microsoft stock does not gain control over how
that capital is used. Nevertheless, while Microsoft maintains the right
to deploy their capital as they choose, individual stock purchasers are
entitled to the returns on their investment. Thus, spouses’ lack of
control over their partners’ human capital does not exclude them from
owning the returns on their investments. Because courts assert that
human capital is separate property, many women are not being justly
compensated for their investments.
The clean financial break has advantages over other divorce
philosophies because it bestows ex-spouses freedom from long-term
financial entanglements. If a clean financial break is to provide equitable divorce settlements, human capital acquired during marriage
must be viewed as marital property.27 This inclusion promises to reward
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domestic spouses more justly for their contributions to the marriage.
Defining human capital as property promises fairness in divorce settlements much more than the current no-fault system.
Nathan W. Andersen is a senior at Brigham Young University majoring in
English with a critical writing emphasis. He will attend the J. Reuben Clark Law
School at BYU this fall.
L. John LeSueur is majoring in economics with a minor in philosophy at Brigham
Young University. He plans to begin law school this fall.
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DIVORCE AND WOMEN
SYED FAHAD SAGHIR

In dealing with divorce proceedings the legal system is inherently bent
toward men. The law could make several important changes that might
facilitate justice and equality in such cases.

D

ivorce is now a very prominent societal ill affecting millions of
Americans and threatening to affect even more. Even though
its adverse effects are now apparent, there has been tremendous growth
in the number of divorces in the United States. Each year
divorce terminates more than one million marriages. In fact, more
than forty percent of marriages that took place during the 1980s are
expected to end in divorce.1 Divorce issues become important not only
because they complicate the family system, but also because of their serious social and economic consequences in American life, particularly
for women and children. Though divorce by nature is destructive, its
detrimental effects are further aggravated by flaws in the judicial system. Certain divorce laws regarding division of property, alimony, and
the system’s limited definition of community assets have caused many
women and children great and unnecessary hardships.
In 1969, California passed the first no-fault divorce statute in the
United States. While the previous laws required some form of fault
from a partner as grounds for seeking divorce, the new law only requires one partner to assert their incompatibility. Formerly, all financial
and economic consequences were tied to fault, demonstrating bias
against the victim of fault. The new law, however, seeks to distribute
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wealth and income of divorcing parties on the basis of fairness and
equity rather than moral history. Using mostly data collected close to
the implementation of the new law, this article will demonstrate that,
despite some positive developments, several changes are in order.
Research on marital property reveals that most divorcing couples
have little or no property to divide. This is mainly because couples are
relatively young when they divorce and, hence, are in the lower income
groups. Therefore, sharing of community property has not been much
of a source of disagreement. However, the family home has always been
and continues to be divided property. Traditionally, since the woman
was perceived as the innocent victim of divorce, and because she had
decorated and maintained the house, she was awarded the family
home. However, because of the equal division requirement of the
Family Law Act,2 the number of homes being divided equally has risen
sharply, which generally means that the two parents maintain joint
ownership or the house is sold and the proceeds shared equally. As a
result of the new law, the percentage of women getting the greater part
of home equity sharply declined from sixty-one percent in 1968, under
the old system, to forty-six percent in 1977, under the new law.3 Since
women normally gain custody of children, there has been a greater
displacement of women and children since the new law was passed.
Generally, alimony is awarded more in initial years of divorce than
in later years, probably because alimony and child support are lumped
together in an unallocated award. However, the trend of women receiving alimony is decreasing. A survey done in Connecticut’s New Haven
County shows that in the 1970s, fifty-one percent of divorced women
received alimony compared to thirty percent in the 1980s. A closer
analysis reveals that women in the highest income group who had been
married for fifteen years or more received the highest award.4 This
probably means that women from lower income groups suffer the most
and often live on the brink of poverty.
The equalization principle tends to even out the financial burden
of one household becoming two, so that each member suffers a proportional reduction in standard of living. This law makes the father pay
a certain amount to the mother for child support. However, this
approach raises a debatable issue about how to evaluate costs of raising
children. Should the costs be estimated using pre-divorce figures or the
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expenses incurred after the divorce? The latter method can sometimes
lead to a huge discrepancy, since costs often increase after divorce when
the mother must look for employment and arrange for childcare.5 Even
though there has been a rise in the number of fathers gaining custody
of children, child support awards are granted mainly to women. However, a look at the data reveals a great deal of injustice to women. The
cost estimated by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1984 of raising a
child in a two-parent urban family with a moderate budget was $5,951;
for those with a low income budget the cost was $3,968. By contrast,
the average child support granted in the 1980s was $2,657. This
suggests that fathers paid less than half the expenses of raising their
children.6 Nan D. Hunter notes the following:
Increasing rates of divorce will, over time, lead to a major transfer from men to women of the bulk of family care expenses. . . . The
child support system thus contributes to the feminization of poverty,
or the massive shift of women-headed households into the official
zone of poverty.7

Even more poignant is the situation of the household incomes after
divorce. A survey conducted in Los Angeles County in 1978 showed
that the male post-divorce standard of living rose by forty-two percent,
while that of women plummeted seventy-three percent.8 Judges have
always been wary of awarding more than fifty percent of the husband’s
income to his wife and children. Hypothetically speaking, suppose a
husband’s income is $1000. The judge awards $450 a month to the
wife for herself and her two children. Prior to divorce, four people
shared $1000, but now three people share $450 and the husband has
$550 to himself. Additionally, he may save on taxes because of the
support he provides, while the wife actually pays taxes on her support
money. Such problems are further aggravated by factors such as inflation and non-compliance.
Another way divorce laws create injustice for women is by their
refusal to recognize a professional educational degree as a community
asset. Typically, such issues are raised when a spouse, usually a wife,
supports the other spouse through school with hopes of a brighter
financial future for the family. During this time, she often provides fi-
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nancial support as well as some household services, which would otherwise have been provided by the husband. If divorce occurs once these
tough days are over and the husband has acquired his professional
education, the law refuses to recognize the role of the wife in the
increased earning ability of her husband.
Another post-divorce problem facing women is entering the work
force. A survey conducted in the early 1980s regarding divorced
women showed that a mere thirty-two percent of women had worked
full-time throughout their marriages. The rest had worked either parttime or full-time on an irregular basis, while the remaining sixteen percent had always been full-time homemakers.
The trauma is greatest for a woman when she enters the work force
for the first time. Faced with the immediate pressure of finding a job,
she is likely to accept the first job she is offered, which in most cases
pays less than her skills should demand. This, coupled with the fact
that jobs traditionally held by women are quite saturated, has caused
wages in such occupations to be below average and has limited opportunities for professional growth.9
The increased rate of both divorce and participation of women in
the labor market raises important issues regarding care and support of
children. From 1970 to 1981 the number of children living with one
parent increased by fifty-four percent.10 Considering that most mothers
gain custody of children and that they are mostly left impoverished
after divorce, reduced economic circumstances would be a likely characteristic of children with divorced parents.
Following divorce, families normally change their residences, forcing
children to change schools, social circles, and neighborhoods. Even if the
child’s past teachers or friends do not provide much support, the familiar
environment of the school proves to be a powerful source of stability for
the child. This sudden disruption causes the mental trouble of coping
with changes and has an adverse effect on the child’s mental abilities.
Part of the cause of the mental anguish for children is the fact that
the newly-divorced mother has to seek employment. A mother’s
decision to work outside the home is based on factors such as her own
needs, the needs of her children, and the needs of the family unit.11
For mothers lacking an alternative source of income, the financial factor is particularly important. Although employment can bring self-
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sufficiency, she may feel overburdened; and it may be difficult for her
to find enough time for the emotional and physical needs of her children. Often the children are left with baby-sitters in the morning and
are picked up after work. Upon arriving home, the mother again gets
busy with household chores such as preparing dinner and cleaning
house. Thus, the children suffer not only from less attention from their
fathers, but also from their mothers.12 Many children suffer even more
because they were accustomed to a mother who was a full-time homemaker. Since an average American family does not have grandparents or
other extended family members available (because of the hectic American lifestyle), and since fathers typically refuse to baby-sit, mothers
generally shoulder all childcare responsibilities.13
The sudden decline in the standard of living of the post-divorce
family does not go unnoticed by the child. He compares his present
lifestyle to the kind his family enjoyed previously. He also feels resentment and a sense of deprivation by looking at the considerably higher
current standard of living of his father or his father’s new family. This,
coupled with the psychological inaccessibility he feels toward his
mother, is a cause of great mental disturbance for him, more so because
of the rapid and simultaneous occurrence of these events.14
A correlation exists between experiences early in life and educational outcomes.15 Children who experience divorce tend to perform
poorly in their educational lives compared with contemporaries raised
with both parents.16 A recent study by the British National Child
Development Study shows that the educational performances of girls
from divorced families are influenced by the working status of their
mothers. Girls with nonworking lone mothers are less likely to have
high level qualifications than young women from intact families or
those with a working lone mother.17 There is a similar trend among
boys, except that the likelihood of obtaining higher education is lower
for boys with lone mothers, whether or not those mothers work.
Many surveys and studies provide evidence that the economic circumstances in adulthood differ significantly between children from disrupted backgrounds and those brought up in intact families. Maclean
and Wadsworth, in their analysis of the British National Survey of
Health and Development, found that adult men from disrupted family
backgrounds were more likely to be unemployed and more likely to fall
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in the lowest income bracket, when compared to men from intact families. A similar American survey shows that children of divorced parents
were more likely to be “idle,” meaning neither employed nor pursuing an
education. Women from nonworking lone mother families are expected
to have lower household incomes when compared with women from intact families and with women from working, lone mother families.
Women from employed lone mother families tend to have economic circumstances not much different from their peers from intact families.
Hence, in a girl’s case, having an employed mother enhances prospects of
high educational and economic achievement.
As young people grow they will marry and have children of their
own. It is a well-established fact that people who marry early and bear
children at a young age are at a greater risk of divorce. Research shows
that young women from disrupted family backgrounds are more likely
to cohabit and become pregnant at an earlier age than their contemporaries from intact families.18 However, this research also reveals that the
differences in giving birth to children outside of wedlock between those
with lone working mothers and those with lone nonworking mothers
are not as high as their educational and economic differences.
In light of the difficult circumstances in which most divorced
women and their children live, there are a few judicial changes to
recommend. First, the law should expand its definition of “community
asset” to include career assets such as professional education or job
training that the other spouse directly or indirectly helped to acquire.
Second, since economic security is vital to the upbringing of children,
the law should work to ensure that child support is reflective of the
actual costs of raising children. Total costs should be divided equitably
between husband and wife and should take inflation into account. To
prevent the child from feeling a sense of deprivation, the child must be
allowed to live the lifestyle of the wealthier of the two parents, if they
are not equally wealthy. Also, if the father does not have the economic
ability to provide the support his child needs, the government should
intervene with financial support. The United States government ran
into a surplus last year. There would be no better use of the excess
funds than investing them in the future of young Americans.
Finally, the law should provide adequate financial security to
women at the time of divorce, especially to those who have spent their
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entire marriages as homemakers. Alimony assistance should cover a
period long enough to allow women to obtain some sort of job training
to enhance their employment opportunities. Older women who have
remained housewives all their lives and who do not have a bright
prospect of finding a respectable job, should receive enough spousal
support to equalize the standard of living of both the spouses. According to the data, it is evident that having a lone working mother brings
positive effects on the daughter’s educational and professional
prospects. Thus, the law should encourage divorced mothers to find
employment. One way to accomplish this might be to further reduce
taxes for divorced, working mothers.
Despite many needs for improvement, there is evidence that
progress is occurring in at least one area of the law. A 1978 survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census revealed that only fifty percent of divorced women received funds for child support or alimony on
time and that a quarter of them received less than the stipulated
amount. Not surprisingly, there was little judicial interference with any
noncompliance, mostly because people viewed it unwise to bring suit
unless the amount due exceeded the cost of hiring a lawyer. To correct
this problem, laws such as the one passed by the Utah legislature in
1997 have allowed courts to suspend the drivers licenses, professional
or occupational licenses, and recreational licenses of a financially
responsible parent if he or she has neither made timely payments nor
has in good faith made any effort to do so.
It takes little more than a glance to discover that the law is bent
toward men. Although the judicial system has come a long way toward
providing greater justice for both members of divorce, there are still a
number of changes that need to be implemented before our system can
rightfully claim to be just.

Syed Fahad Saghir is a freshman at Brigham Young University majoring in
economics and planning to study computer science. Originally from Karachi,
Pakistan, Syed plans to utilize his knowledge and skills to help his people and provide for their legal needs.
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ALIMONY REFORM
H.L. ROGERS

While Singer trenchantly attacks the faults in no-fault divorce, the alimony
system she proposes falls short. Alimony is indeed necessary but must be
based on something other than the traditional economic rationale, which
disenfranchises women and children.

I

n the article “Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the
Shoe Won’t Fit,” Jana Singer discusses the problems in the evolving
no-fault divorce laws and argues the need for alimony. However,
both no-fault divorce and the alimony system she proposes (based on
an economic rationale) are inadequate. First, I intend to show the problems with no-fault divorce as chronicled by Singer and others. Second,
I will discuss how Margaret Brinig and other feminist scholars have
found that the economic justification Singer proposes for alimony,
partly in this article and more extensively in the article “Alimony and
Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony,” is not capable of equitably awarding alimony to the
noneducated or nonprofessional spouse.
Economic justification is not capable of equity in all cases because it
falsely assumes that family specialization is always desirable. Because
economic rationale often disenfranchises women and children, many
of those adversely affected do not have marketable commodities. As a
result, they often receive less through alimony than they should. Not
only does this demonstrate why the notion of a clean financial break is
impossible, but it also provides evidence to show that alimony should
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not be seen as a hurdle to overcome in divorce, but as an equitable
means of compensating for capital lost through divorce.

No-Fault Divorce
No-fault divorce has two main purposes. The first is to exclude
fault from divorce proceedings, while the second is to enable a financial
and emotional clean break between the couple. Although the first purpose has made divorce proceedings simpler and cleaner, the second has
been shown to be nearly or completely impossible.
When no-fault divorce took effect in California in 1970, it implied
the dissolution of alimony payments. However, as both Singer and
Herma Hill Kay have discussed, the primary reason for moving to nofault divorce was to dissolve the prerequisite of fault in a divorce and to
enable a clean break in the marriage.1 Finding fault in a marriage could
be used for two purposes only: to show a no-fault basis for divorce by
establishing “irreconcilable differences” or to determine the custody of
a child produced from the marriage.2 The impact of no-fault divorce on
alimony came from its second purpose—to enable a clean break financially and emotionally. Because of the idea of “the clean financial
break,” “divorce proceedings were to sever not only the couple’s legal
union, but their economic relationship as well.”3
Eliminating fault from divorce has helped create divorce procedures that limit adversarial procedure, thus diminishing the emotional
damages that stem from sometimes lengthy and harsh litigation. The
clean break theory, however, has proved impractical in marriages that
include children.

Clean Break
Margaret Brinig has shown that the goal of achieving a clean break
through divorce in a marriage with children is impossible:
Most of the time divorce involves minor children. Whether or not
we characterize them as unwilling victims of their parents’ decision to
separate, they are affected. These effects may be temporary, as with
the emotional or relocation costs of divorce, the probable lowered
standard of living, or the immediate loss of a continued parental
contact. Children also lose over the very long-term according to a
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number of studies. Thus arguably there can be no clean break when
children are involved.4

Children need a relationship of some type even after the marriage
is over. One spouse cannot simply disappear without adverse effects.
And usually neither spouse wants to disappear.
Because a clean break is not possible in all circumstances, the
dissolution of alimony is also not possible in all circumstances. In cases
where there are children, contact between ex-spouses must continue,
and alimony is no longer a hurdle. Since the idea of a clean financial
break, alimony was seen as a hurdle to overcome. If a spouse had to
continue to pay alimony, the break could not be achieved. Thus,
“alimony, if awarded at all, was to be awarded sparingly, and only for
the short-term.”5

Alimony
In an earlier article, Singer expands on the rationale that dissolved
alimony:
The advent of no-fault divorce and the demise of the state-imposed
marriage contract significantly undermined these traditional rationales
for alimony. Because divorce no longer required a showing of fault or
breach, a damage remedy seemed inappropriate. Similarly, because
marital obligations were no longer officially gender-based, an alimony
remedy premised on the husband’s support obligation and available
only to the wife seemed both anachronistic and discriminatory.6

The reasoning behind no-fault divorce led to the dissolution of
alimony. As shown above, however, such reasoning was faulty in
marriages with children. But alimony also has other intrinsic problems
that Singer discusses. For instance, traditional husband-to-wife alimony
seems discriminatory in an era when both male and female are shown
to be equally capable in the work force. Therefore, alimony is necessary
in certain divorces, but any alimony stipulated must be reformed.
Under current theory, and according to Singer’s argument, the alimony that would be enforced now is based on an economic rationale.
In her view, economic rationale for alimony assumes that couples will
attempt to maximize their commodities in their marriage relationship.
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These commodities include not only traditional aspects such as income
and material wealth, but also things such as home-cooked meals, children, and family time. Economic rationale also theorizes that couples
will specialize in order to gain more commodities more efficiently. Marital specialization theory holds that the spouse that is more productive in
a certain sector will specialize in that sector. For example, if the female
spouse is better suited to raise and care for children, she will stay home
and care for them while the male spouse enters the work force.7 Thus,
following economic rationale, alimony would be based on the commodities lost by the dissolution of the marriage and its specialization.

Economic Rationale
Two main problems exist with approaching divorce using an economic rationale. First, this approach incorrectly assumes that marital
specialization is the most efficient means of a couple increasing their
“commodities,” meaning the overall well-being of the couple. Second,
the rationale often disenfranchises women and children because it is
difficult to gauge a commodity that has no value in an economic
market such as material compensation for time spent raising children
instead of earning a degree and entering the work force.
Specialization is not always the most efficient way to sustain the
well-being of the marriage and family. As Brinig points out, specialization is only most efficient in a marriage “that ends in due course.”8 If
the marriage ends prematurely in divorce or death, the specialized
spouse that remains with the children must learn to fill roles that he or
she knows little or nothing about. For example, if the male was the sole
economic provider and he is left to care for the children, he will have
to learn quickly about household production and child-rearing.
Conversely, if the female that raised the children and carried out
the household production is left without the sole economic provider,
she will have to quickly enter a work force for which she is not prepared. In these circumstances, it would be far more efficient for the
male to participate in some of the child-rearing and household production and for the female to participate moderately in the work force.
Thus, economic rationale is not the best model for alimony decisions,
because if the roles are shared, this model is not suited to discern where
commodities were earned in the more complex setup. Also, economic
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rationale theory fails to consider the psychological effects of a divorce
on a spouse in a relationship where the roles are completely specialized.
Another problem with economic rationale is that it often disenfranchises women and children. Joan C. Williams notes that this
rationale “not only impoverishes women, but also results in systematic
disinvestment in children.”9 Although many would like to think differently, gender roles still influence economy. As Singer states, “despite
recent attempts by some economic theorists to delink marital specialization from gender roles, the two remain closely, perhaps inextricably,
connected.”10 When specialization occurs in a marriage, the male
almost always goes into the work force while the female stays at home
to raise the children and maintain the household. Because of the dominance of these gender roles, women and children almost never have
marketable commodities. Thus, alimony is still almost always paid
from male to female. And while it is arguably easier to calculate how
much a male in the work force is worth and will be worth, it is difficult
to calculate how much the female has earned and will earn in the
household. This makes it difficult to determine how much the male
owes the female.
Because of these two problems, the economic rationale that Singer
proposes for deciding alimony needs reform. Alimony is necessary,
especially because gender roles often leave the female spouse with few
or no marketable skills. As Joan Krauskopf shows,
Every court reacted sympathetically to the inequity of one spouse
receiving no compensation for sacrifice of standard of living and personal funds in order to enable the other spouse to obtain the personal
benefit of advanced education, which significantly increased earning
capacity. A fundamental sense of fairness was repelled by the enrichment of one at the expense of the other ex-spouse when, contrary to
expectations, divorce precluded sharing the personal benefit reaped
by the educated spouse.11

Currently, courts want to award spouses that have supported the
other spouse through school and into the work place, especially if
the divorce takes place before the noneducated spouse can enjoy the
higher income that comes from additional education. Alimony is
necessary to ensure the well-being of the noneducated spouse and the
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children after the divorce. As the current attitude of the courts demonstrate, it is unfair that one spouse sacrifice his or her market value to
send the other spouse through school without receiving some type of
compensation should divorce occur.

Conclusion
Thus, alimony is necessary but difficult to award. The easiest way
to award alimony is by using the economic justification. However, this
method has been shown to be unfair. Often the most prized commodity in the marriage is not the money earned by the working spouse.
And often it is not even the care of the household by the other spouse.
As Singer states, “The most important career asset associated with
marriage is not the career enhancement itself; it is instead, the ability to
advance a career while at the same time experiencing the benefits of
parenthood.”12 Singer concludes, “This analysis implies that, for purposes of apportioning career assets, it may be appropriate to distinguish
13
between marriages that have and have not produced children.” It is
important to determine the type of marriage relationship in order to
adequately award the alimony. Differences in the law should be maintained for specialized marriages, marriages where specialization is not
total, and marriages with and without children, among others. Alimony
based on laws that differentiate between families would be more
equitable. However, although alimony remains a necessity, the law will
have to find and implement better ways of awarding it.
H.L. Rogers, a junior from Arvada, Colorado, is an English major and philosophy
minor at Brigham Young University. He would eventually like to work as an
advocate for charities in developing countries.
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STANDARD
ROLE SPECIFICATIONS
AND DEFAULT-BASED
PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS
XIAOYU LIN
Premarital Agreements based on three standardized, or default, role specifications will help solve post-divorce financial inequalities created by current
interpretations of no-fault divorce laws.

M

arriage is a contract in terms of the agreed upon long-term
mutual commitment and the expected joint benefits from
the relationship. Not only do spouses anticipate that marriage will provide companionship and the joys and fulfillment of child
rearing, but they also expect it to secure their respective emotional and
economic investments.1 Traditional fault divorce law chose to protect
these investments through prescriptions on proper marital behaviors of
each party, an approach that often led to hostility and unpredictable
results. Seeking to avoid these problems, laws since 1969 have generally utilized no-fault considerations to regulate economic decisions
in divorce.
Despite this proper focus, however, laws based on no-fault principles have repeatedly failed to properly interpret key elements in a
couple’s economic partnership. Most notably, these laws have partially
or completely neglected to take into account a domestic spouse’s many
investments in the well-being of his or her children and in the careerenhancement of the other spouse. Investments into these areas, called
human capital by economists, have significant economic value and
deserve more careful consideration. Unless this occurs, current no-fault
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interpretations and nonsystematic premarital agreement practices will
continue to facilitate opportunistic marital defections and disproportional burdens on homemakers.
One way to ensure economically equitable divorce decisions is to
implement a system of standard role specifications. Based on an analysis
of the partnership aspects of marriage contract, it seems that using three
general standards, or default modes, of role specifications to guide court
and other decisions would minimize current problems. Not only would
these three default modes serve as guideposts for the courts, but they
would make it easier for potential spouses to customize premarital agreements in areas such as property division, alimony, and child custody
arrangements and support. This approach should better protect the
economic investments of the domestic spouse should divorce occur.

Partership and Human Capital
The contractual nature of marriage contract signals a dual partnership for the parties in cases where there are children. In the production
of human capital (the bearing and rearing of children), the parties are
equal partners and marriage between them is a joint agreement.2 Each
spouse is equally responsible for feeding, nurturing, and educating their
children; and both expect to enjoy the benefits of parenting. In terms
of the human capital of each party, however, marriage can be an
unequal partnership, especially where one spouse serves a primarily domestic role. Role specification within marriage usually means that one
spouse must sacrifice his or her own career opportunities to enhance
the human capital of the other spouse.
Although the career-enhancement of the nondomestic spouse is
mostly due to “educational institutions and on-the-job training,”3 the
domestic spouse invests considerable time and effort to facilitate this
option. As a result, the helping spouse has valid claims on compensation for his or her diminished or lost career opportunities. In this sense,
post divorce spousal support might be understood as “legal enforcement of insurance payments” in return for the “substantial marriagespecific investment” undertaken by the domestic spouse.4
Similar instances of reduced human capital appear in situations
where both spouses work but one chooses to work less in order to fulfill
domestic or other responsibilities or interests. Even where both spouses
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work full-time, research has shown that one spouse (usually the
woman) will earn substantially less, again primarily because of domestic
responsibilities. All of this points to the need for legal safeguards
against post-divorce financial inequalities. One such safeguard is the
premarital agreement.

Premarital Agreement
Properly constructed premarital agreements can offer an effective
avenue of security for couples seeking to protect themselves from
potential post-divorce economic problems. Premarital agreement (often
called prenuptial contract) is a way to reinstate legally the seriousness
and commitment that a marriage relationship signals. Prospective
couples that decide their own terms of marital contract regarding
shared goals, labor division, and financial arrangements enjoy two main
benefits. First, they are more motivated to invest emotionally in the
relationship. Second, they have a more effective means of settling financial arrangements and/or disputes in case of divorce. The fact that premarital agreements are legally binding and enforceable decreases the
likelihood of opportunistic behavior on the part of either spouse.5
The concept of premarital agreement is not new. Couples for
centuries, especially celebrities, have chosen to form agreements with
one another before marriage. However, in terms of whether premarital
agreements are an effective way to solve current problems, contemporary theorists have differed in their views. Lloyd Cohen, for example,
argues that current forms of premarital agreements do not adequately
address the needs of those most needing them. Because these forms
deal mostly with nontraditional instances of divorce (such as protection
of several valuable assets), spouses in traditional marriages where
divorce costs are most difficult to estimate are left without effective
recourse. Based on these difficulties, Cohen believes that premarital
agreements are ineffective in traditional marriages.6
Because of the above problems, theorists Elizabeth and Robert
Scott assert that traditional marriages would be better served by replacing premarital contract with a device they call a “relational contract.”7
This contract, they believe, would legally reinforce marriage vows by
including considerations of several important aspects of the relationship. Although Scott and Scott correctly refute Cohen by showing how
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at least the concept of premarital agreement can still function, they fail
to create any concrete role specifications that would serve as defaults, or
models, in constructing the type of contracts they propose.
The primary advantage to creating default modes is that they provide traditional couples with an efficient way to customize premarital
contracts. A second advantage is that traditional spouses can rely on
more effective premarital contracts to better protect their economic
investments in the relationship.

Default Modes and Applications
Role specification is likely the most important factor in the development of default modes. Based on the most common types of role
specifications, three default modes emerge as those best suited for standardized application. The first mode is that of the traditional marriage,
in which one spouse serves as the sole breadwinner and the other
assumes a solely domestic role. In the second mode, both spouses bring
income to the family but one of them exerts more effort in domestic responsibilities, resulting in unequal financial contributions to the family.
The third mode consists of two spouses with a combined income high
enough for them to continue working while they rely on a third party
to perform domestic duties.
To illustrate how these default modes might practically function, it
may be useful to provide a few limited examples of divorce proceedings
arising under each mode. In the third mode, current no-fault considerations may be safely utilized because these decisions are, as a rule, based
on property division. If both spouses own similarly valued assets, equitable economic distribution is likely. When children are involved the law
should mandate a minimum economic obligation of each parent. The
main goal should be to ensure that the child’s (or children’s) standard of
living will remain reasonably similar to what it was before the divorce.
For divorce cases arising under the first and second modes, and
where children are not involved, modern no-fault considerations
generally do not require alimony payments to the economically weaker
spouse. The reason for this, correct or not, is due to the expectation
that the spouse has the ability and the opportunity to secure gainful
employment. However, if a spouse has forgone education or job
training opportunities to support the career-enhancement of the other
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spouse, he or she should be able to claim compensation for lost human
capital. One way to address this need is through repayment of the
domestic spouse’s contribution. Such a contribution could best be determined by a legal analysis of the premarital agreement. Of course,
authorities would need to take into account the length of the marriage.
If divorce occurs under the first and second modes, and the couple
has children, the best way to determine custody rights is to analyze the
level of each spouse’s involvement with each child. According to Scott
and Scott, custody rights should be “proportional to each party’s investment in the relationship with the children prior to divorce, and each
party [should] continue to invest at that [same] level afterward.”8
Because marriage usually diminishes human capital for domestic
spouses in the first and second modes, if there are children involved the
nondomestic spouse should be responsible for the majority of each
child’s living and educational expenses. Moreover, the domestic spouse
should receive monetary support if he or she stayed at home full-time
or received minimal remuneration due to domestic obligations. In
either case, barring remarriage, the domestic spouse should receive
spousal support that includes assistance with living and job training
expenses for a set period of time, based on the length of the marriage.
For instance, ten years of marriage justifies ten years of financial support. If the duration of the marriage spans a period long enough that
the domestic spouse has permanently lost a career opportunity, the law
should consider the possibility of awarding alimony for the remainder
of the domestic spouse’s life.9

Conclusion
To help remedy the ills of some current no-fault divorce practices,
future laws would do well to more carefully consider the economic factors in divorce proceedings. This is especially true in cases where one
spouse sacrifices career opportunities to take care of children or enhance the career of the other spouse. One effective way to address the
situation is through the use of premarital contracts based on three standardized role specifications, or default modes. Customizing premarital
contracts based on these default modes will not only serve to guide
court decisions, but will protect rather than punish those couples who
choose to form families.
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AND YOU THOUGHT YOU
WEREN’T BRINGING ANY
BAGGAGE TO YOUR
MARRIAGE
BRYAN HARPER
From an economic standpoint, marriage is inherently efficient, and divorce
is inherently inefficient. Divorce economics point to human capital as a
possible solution. Yet human capital is unconstitutional and irrational in
the context of divorce. Love and affection are the only foundations for an
efficient marriage.

M

arriage is a legal relationship, but it is a personal, physical,
and often religious relationship as well. Regulating or legally
defining such a relationship is invasive, difficult, and easily
discriminatory.1 This article will discuss the ideas of marriage, divorce,
and their problems and resolutions primarily from an economic standpoint. Starting with the notion that marriage can be looked at in terms
of economics leads to two different versions of an “economically
efficient” marriage. Divorce scenarios result in economically inefficient
and unfair burdens, the majority of which are borne by women and
children. For economists, human capital could represent one potential
solution to the problems of divorce. Unfortunately, as this article will
argue, the properties of human capital render it both unconstitutional
and economically inefficient in divorce, based on economists’ own
efficiency measurements. This leaves us to examine things more basic
to the marriage and divorce problem, such as the reasons we marry in
the first place.
According to Ann Laquer Estin, “Economists argue that their
analytical tools are appropriate to the family as well as the market because in both settings individuals make choices in a context of scarce
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resources.”2 Gary Becker, noted family behavioralist, amplifies these
economic principles:
When men and women decide to marry, or have children, or divorce, they attempt to raise their welfare by comparing benefits and
costs. So they marry when they expect to be better off than if they
remain single, and they divorce if that is expected to increase their
welfare.3

Becker’s theory, sometimes referred to as the “new home economics,”
depicts a household as a firm that combines the resources available to
it—the time of household members and various market goods—to
produce the desired outputs or commodities it desires.4
There seem to be two different notions of an economically efficient
marriage. The first may be classified as the traditional or 1950s marriage, while the second represents the present-day, less rigid form
of marriage. A closer examination of these will allow an explanation of
marital economic efficiency.
Specific gender roles characterized marriage in the 1950s. In the
“Leave it to Beaver” model, Ward Cleaver leaves the home to work and
provide for the family. The model assumes he is best suited for the
workplace. June Cleaver, on the other hand, stays home with the children, makes a mean apple pie, and repairs scrapes and cuts in a traditionally feminine manner. Economists use comparative advantage in
production of children and other household commodities to explain
these roles. This “specialization and division of labor” implies that one
spouse must choose the household and the other must choose the
marketplace.5 This theory assumes that women, by virtue of their
biology, possess a “natural comparative advantage over men in the
household, as opposed to market production and that men enjoyed a
correspondingly natural comparative advantage.”6
Conversely, the present ideal might best be characterized by a less
rigid understanding of traditional gender roles. “Margaret Brinig . . .
has suggested that the standard [historically based] economic account
fails to consider important psychological costs associated with specialization.”7 These refer to things such as women who would like to be
working, men who would like to work less, either spouse spending
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more or less time with the children, and so forth.8 Perhaps then, “an
efficient union would entail both partners having significant ties to the
paid labor force and spending significant time with their children.”9 All
facets of married life can thus be enjoyed by both partners in amounts
they so desire. Key to this ideal is individual choice, its importance in
the family, and its subsequent constitutional efficiency. Present-day
ideals seem to embrace an individual’s right to choose while recognizing
that men and women may desire something other than historical gender roles.
The Supreme Court has upheld individuality within the bounds of
marriage. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court concluded that couples
have a constitutional right to obtain and use contraception.10 Justice
Goldberg’s opinion “emphasized also the personal liberty guaranteed by
the Constitution that allows individuals within a marriage to make
choices about family planning.”11 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme
Court asserted that “it is the right of the individual, married or single
to be free from the unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person . . . as to whether to bear children.”12
And in Roe v. Wade the Court noted that “women have certain individual privacy rights that may be expressed by terminating a pregnancy.”13
These three decisions have reasserted a “jurisprudence of decisional
autonomy that extends to the individual within a marriage.”14 Parenthood is a choice specific to the wills of either spouse. No longer do the
courts seem reluctant to acknowledge the individual right to choose
different paths in a marriage. These examples will be referred to later in
this article.
Having discussed marriage and its subsequent efficiency in these
two scenarios, it seems natural to continue with a discussion of divorce.
First, however, a presentation of the present divorce model’s effects on
women seems appropriate.
According to a recent California study, the standard of living for
women after divorce decreased by seventy-three percent, while the standard of living for men actually increased by forty-two percent.15 In
addition, financial awards to women at the time of divorce seem to
greatly devalue their marital contributions. In studying divorce,
Katharine Baker and Lenore Weitzman note this economic disparity at
divorce: divorce proceedings undeniably benefit the husband.16

50 / BYU Prelaw Review

One response to this apparent economic injustice during divorce is
joint ownership of human capital. Human capital is defined as “the
investment of time and money in self development to enhance skills
and abilities, which are a source and form of wealth.”17 Economists
assert that human capital and any wealth generated by it may be
shared, similar to other marital properties, by divorced spouses in
amounts corresponding to their needs.
To determine how to divide human capital, economists examine a
woman’s contribution to the marriage and any increase to human
capital regardless of whether she worked outside the home. All marital
assets, human capital included, are pooled in divorce and split based
upon need. This practice exposes a “need” to call it jointly owned.
Charles Reich summarized one scenario of human capital in his 1990
article “The New Property after 25 Years.” He puts forth an example of
a husband and wife who have no resources at the time of divorce except
the husband’s professional degree. He further expands this scenario by
outlining the wife’s choices to further her husband’s goal of obtaining
this degree. These choices include foregoing her own education and
subsequent career, working to pay expenses, and reducing her own
standard of living for a period of time. He argues that it is unjust not to
calculate this form of “property” in divorce settlements.18
Furthermore, women consistently bear the majority of the costs and
labor associated with child rearing or “household production,” complicating the divorce scenario. Regardless of her reduced ability, a woman is
expected to earn and provide “without financial transfers from her husband.”19 The assumption is that if she is granted joint ownership of her
husband’s human capital her ability to provide would not be as reduced.
Hence, her burden at the time of divorce would be more fair.
Yet there are complications in the designation of human capital as
a jointly ownable resource. First, the Thirteenth Amendment and a
discussion of the philosophical ideas of personhood and self-constitution
leads to an examination of how joint ownership undermines present-day
constitutional efficiency within marriage, as is evident from the three
Supreme Court decisions cited above. Additionally, Kaldor-Hicks and
Pareto economic efficiency norms function at the time of marriage, but
erect barriers to a joint ownership mandate at the time
of divorce.
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In Severs v. Severs, the Court ruled that the Thirteenth Amendment
prohibits a husband from paying his wife a portion of the value of his
license or degree, since it could subject the husband to involuntary
servitude.20 If enhanced earning capacity were considered property, the
husband would be locked into his current career, thus negating his right
to choice. “[The Court] opines that it would be unfair to force the husband to remain in a career he does not like, or to continue paying based
upon the value of that career.”21 In United States v. Kozminiski, the
Court limited involuntary servitude to actual physical or legal coercion.22 A court’s decision in favor of joint ownership of human capital
would be understood as “legal coercion” and, hence, unconstitutional.
Margaret Radin comments on this situation in her article “Reinterpreting Property”:
To make the degree holding spouse . . . compensate his former
spouse for the development of his own abilities is problematic for his
personhood too. He is at least (symbolically) locked into the career
projected at the time of divorce, and indeed locked into the marriage
itself in a sense. . . . He is locked for life into the career he chose during marriage, because his ex-wife shares forever the self he was then.
That perhaps is too much entrenchment in context to be consistent
with personhood as we now conceive it.23

Economic efficiency norms, tests which determine whether or not
an action is economically efficient, are central to both economics and
law with regard to marriage and divorce. As the aforementioned marital
ideals are rooted in this theory, it seems only appropriate to ensure that
divorce maintains an equal level of efficiency.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency norms, or predetermined values for material or nonmaterial concepts, seem to make the marital contract enforceable.24 They require that divorce be handled in a manner akin to tort
law, using liability rules that define marriage entitlements financially.25
Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, all aspects of marriage would be given a
value and, at the time of divorce, payment would be calculated based
on predetermined values.
The daunting nature of the Kaldor-Hicks endeavor is obvious.
It is difficult to accurately and fairly value all aspects of the marital
union. Moreover, if ever accomplished, Kaldor-Hicks divorce efficiency
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represents a definite and undeniably heavy judicial presence in divorce
proceedings. Most legal and economic theorists agree that this is most
certainly not an efficient use of the social property inherent in the
judicial system.26 Notwithstanding, placing a value on human capital
and assuming its ability to be split or jointly owned denies the previous
paragraphs’ suppositions of the importance of individual autonomy
and the rights inherent in the Thirteenth Amendment.
Pareto efficiency is achieved exclusive of any defining body. It is the
result, when applied to divorce, of “husbands and wives [behaving] as
rational, self-interested bargainers [who] will avoid arrangements that
entail serious financial risks.”27 Central here is the idea of rationality in
divorce proceedings.
Deeply felt emotions seem to negate any rationality and necessitate
third party negotiations during divorce settlements. Even more, human
capital is still seen as individual property: “Law students, both male
and female, married and single, tend to regard their . . . law degrees as
uniquely the product of their own talents and labors, both before
and during law school.”28 This only supports the supposition that a
“rational” divorce is an oxymoron, something impossible, especially
where human capital is concerned.
So it seems that we are inevitably caught between a rock and a hard
place. Though marriage has the potential for economical efficiency, it
can also result in divorce, which is economically inefficient. We are left
with little to support the idea of marriage, let alone entering into it before completion of our own human capitalistic endeavors, if only in an
effort to potentially reduce future divorce complications. Strict calculation of efficiency provides little incentives for marriage.
Most couples do marry “because they love each other and want to
spend the rest of their lives together.”29 Marriage, divorce, and human
capital issues could be defined, discussed, and dealt with in an easier
manner if couples heeded Margaret Brinig’s advice: “Not business or
money, but wedlock is what the parties [should] contemplate. They are,
or should be, motivated by love and affection to form a mutual and
voluntary compact to live together as husband and wife, until separation by death, for the purpose of mutual happiness, establishing a
family, the continuance of the race, the propagation of children, and
the general good of society.”30
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SHIFTING SEXUAL DIVISIONS
OF LABOR
CHELSEA L. GRIMMIUS

The primary step toward creating a more equitable divorce environment
for men and women does not lie in changing the divorce laws themselves,
but rather in adjusting the existing divisions of labor between the sexes in
individual marriages.

T

he division of labor within marriage is often divided starkly
between men and women, with the husband as the primary
worker and the wife as the primary caretaker. When a couple
chooses to divorce, the sexual division of labor usually leaves the
primary caretaker at a great economic disadvantage. Jana Singer, in her
article “Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won’t
Fit,” discusses how divorce laws have evolved in recent years to compensate for this but have yet to produce an equitable way to divide financial assets after divorce.1 Singer offers suggestions for offsetting
this discrepancy, such as income pooling and limited no-fault divorce
laws, but neglects to address how a rearrangement of the domestic and
professional roles of parents could play a key part in making current
divorce laws work. If the primary objective of lawmakers is to make divorce laws more equitable and reduce the negative financial impact
of divorce on women, then their focus should be making individual
marriages more equitable before the issue of divorce ever arises.
The most common form of the sexual division of labor begins
when one spouse, usually the wife, chooses to forego a career or an
education to take on the role of a primary caretaker. Most often she
continues this role after the marriage dissolves, but without the financial benefits from the primary worker. In contrast, the primary worker
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maintains many of the benefits of parenthood but remains relatively
unaffected financially. In her article “Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New
Theory of Alimony,” Joan Williams illustrates why this is so: “The ideal
worker is typically away from home nine to twelve hours a day. Consequently, an ideal worker-parent will see his young children for only a
few hours each day.”2 After a divorce, men who share custodial rights
with their ex-wives spend about the same amount of time with their
children as they had before. In this way, “The resulting post-divorce
custody arrangements reproduce precisely the dominant pattern during
marriage, but without the corresponding financial sharing that such an
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities assumes.”3
Singer notes that “the structure and pressures of market work generally preclude a primary breadwinner from assuming equal caretaking
responsibilities, either before or after divorce.”4 She uses this structure
to illustrate why divorce laws should financially compensate primary
caretakers after divorce. According to Singer, “advocates of more
equitable divorce outcomes for supporting spouses might insist on
income sharing rules that would require divorcing parents to continue
to pool their joint incomes for a significant time period after divorce.”5
Singer’s suggestions are feasible, but the very need for them is a shortsighted resignation to the inequality that exists; her suggestions preserve
the very relationships they are seeking to compensate for. The question
of why the structure of market work precludes a primary breadwinner
from assuming equal caretaking responsibilities deserves principal
consideration.
The nature of a capitalist market encourages and requires competition to achieve success. If an enterprise seeks to be profitable, it must
employ people who are willing to sacrifice and work hard for the company. For employees seeking to meet the demands of their employers,
this can often mean long hours and extra work outside the office. For a
married man with children, the need for a primary caretaker is essential
if he is to be successful. The primary worker’s salary therefore “reflects
the work of two adults: the ideal-worker’s market labor and the marginalized-caregiver’s unpaid labor.”6 If more effort was focused on finding
ways for families to thrive economically without requiring such a distinct sexual division of labor, the need for continually updated divorce
laws would decrease. If men and women were equally economically
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independent and equally capable of rearing children, there would not be
a need for such programs as income pooling after divorce.7 In order to
foster economic equality as a preventative measure, there are several
changes that could be made to allow a husband and wife to both work
outside the home and be active contributors to domestic responsibilities.
Current examples of how businesses have changed their policies to
accommodate for the shifting division of labor within marriages include job-sharing programs and paternity leave. A law firm in New Jersey has started a job-sharing program that allows workers the benefits
of a full-time job, while only working part-time.8 Two of the women
currently participating in this program are able to each work two and
a half days a week, crossing over on Wednesdays to go over their joint
caseloads. They share an office, a secretary, and phone mail so that they
function, in essence, as one employee. The firm benefits by retaining
experienced employees and the women benefit by having the opportunity to have a family life and a fulfilling career.
Paternity leave is another program designed to allow employees the
benefits of a career and a family life. The National Law Journal conducted a survey recently to find out some of the latest job perks at law
firms around the country. They discovered that over half of the firms
surveyed offer paternity leave for their attorneys. At a Washington D.C.
firm this includes six weeks of full pay.9 Other firms around the nation
are offering up to six months of leave time with partial pay.10
If the majority of corporations were to offer similar programs to
both men and women, husbands and wives could choose to share domestic responsibilities and pursue career goals at the same time. There
are obvious drawbacks to offering and participating in these programs.
Most businesses, for example, depend on the commitment of their
employees to ensure the success of their companies, and promotions to
high positions of responsibility are unlikely if the employee only works
part time. However, the sacrifices that couples may make in choosing
to have both a fulfilling career and a successful family life will be
balanced by the benefits. In addition, as more couples begin to choose
these options, more businesses will find it in their best interest to provide
them as incentives to their employees. Highly qualified professionals
will accept positions with companies that can offer them the benefits
they seek, and if a company intends to retain valuable employees, it is in
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their best interest to offer incentives that accommodate for different
lifestyles. Roger Frankel is a managing partner at the law firm of
Swidler & Berlin Chartered, where they offer six months maternity and
paternity leave, as well as flextime partnership tracks. In Frankel’s view,
the cost of the employment perks are worth it: “If you lose just one
associate that you didn’t want to lose, that’s too many.”11
In addition to the administrative programs that could be introduced to promote a more equal distribution of labor within marriages,
there are needed social changes. As mentioned before, the primary
problem with division of financial assets after divorce stems from the
huge economic discrepancy between the role of a mother and the role
of a father. In order to decrease the negative financial impact of divorce
on women, (and by extension, to prevent some of the reasons for
divorce), we must start within individual marriages. In her book,
Kidding Ourselves: Breadwinning, Babies, and Bargaining Power, Rhona
Mahoney gives suggestions on how women can work within their own
marriages to achieve economic equality.
Mahoney’s main argument rests on the idea that all women should
prepare themselves in some way for work outside the home. They
should acquire skills and education that will allow them to support
themselves. At the same time, men should also prepare themselves to be
able to be caregivers. Such couples, as they choose to “[give] up these
deeply held convictions that women should be primary caregivers to
their children and that men should not or cannot, will bring an end to
the sexual division of labor in the home. Ending the sexual division of
labor in the home will end the link between one’s sex and his or her
work in the marketplace.”12 As this is accomplished, husbands and
wives may choose to share home and market responsibilities, taking
into account their own strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. Once
there are two marketable members of the relationship, economic
equality becomes more attainable.
Today, many married women work outside the home and are often
marketable. However, the higher participation of women in the work
force has not diminished or eliminated their domestic responsibilities.
By contrast, it has increased their workload and forced them into the
problem of the “second shift.” Mahoney defines the “second shift”
as doing all or most of the housework and childcare in the home, in
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addition to working jobs outside the home.13 In order for working
mothers to achieve economic success, they must have partners who are
capable of compensating for their part-time absence in the home by
sharing in domestic responsibilities.
The primary steps toward this sharing of domestic and professional
responsibilities must be taken as much by men as by women. Historically, resistance to the idea of sharing childcare responsibilities has been
strong from both sexes. Mahoney explains why this phenomenon occurs even in the most egalitarian of marriages. Because a woman carries
the child in her womb, she is conscious of its needs for many months
before the man is capable of assuming the same level of consciousness.
After the child is born, especially if the mother chooses to breast-feed,
she develops further interest in the child’s needs. If the father neglects
to participate in this process, or is not encouraged to participate, he
never spends time alone with the infant and does not develop as intimate a connection. When problems arise, the mother is more likely to
intervene because of her vested interest and personal connections with
the child. This cycle continues as the child develops, creating an
increasingly deeper separation of parental roles.14 This separation of
parental roles can only be prevented by individuals within a marriage.
If we intend to create economic equality between men and women, we
must begin on the level of individual couples, educating both as to how
this can be achieved.
There are currently many different groups of professionals working
on the issue of divorce. The law is only one of many avenues for
change. In a sense, Singer’s article is progressive; she asserts her own
ideas for better divorce laws and acknowledges the positive results of
recent changes in the system. But these changes cannot be truly effective without the help of a shift in the sexual division of labor within
marriages. By encouraging men and women to share the professional
and domestic duties more equally during marriage, the burden of
trying to create an equal distribution of financial assets after divorce
would be greatly minimized. Our primary goal as both lawmakers and
citizens, who are concerned with the state of the family, should be to
promote healthy and equal relationships between the sexes. If we
neglect to do this, every other revision we make with respect to divorce
law will, in the long term, be ineffective.
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